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IN A PREVIOUS PAPER I reached  the conclusion  that Phases  I and II of the 
Nixon wage-price  control  program  had achieved  a slight  reduction  in the 
advance  of wages  and  a marked  decline  in the  rise  in prices  between  1971:3 
and 1972:2  as compared  with  econometric  simulations  of the hypothetical 
paths  in the absence  of controls.'  At first  glance  these  relationships  appear 
to have  been  reversed  in the  past  year.  Prices  have  exploded  upward  at rates 
exceeding  all forecasts,  whereas  the apparent  absence  of any significant  re- 
sponse  of wages  to observed  price  behavior  has led to widespread  puzzle- 
ment  about  the  mystery  of the "docile  worker."  If the response  of profits  to 
the business  expansion  in 1972  was sluggish,  the price  rebound  of 1973  ap- 
pears  to have regained  the lost ground.2 
The purpose  of this paper  is to examine  this view of recent  wage and 
Note: This paper  was supported  by National Science  Foundation  Grant  GS-39701.  I 
am grateful  to Dana Johnson for his help in updating  our data file and in performing 
these calculations  on short notice. 
1. Robert J.  Gordon, "Wage-Price Controls and the  Shifting Phillips Curve," 
Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (2:1972), pp. 385-421. Hereafter,  this document 
will be referred  to as BPEA, followed by the date. 
2. An example  of this general  evaluation  is Andrew  F. Brimmer's  comment  that the 
current  inflation  seems  to have  favored  "profit  recipients  and wage earners  in strong  bar- 
gaining positions," while persons with fixed incomes and those receiving  public assis- 
tance  "appear  to have  carried  much of the burden  caused  by the sharp  rise  in the general 
price  level." Wall  Street  Journal,  November 12, 1973. 
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price behavior. Specifically,  how sluggish has been the response of wage in- 
creases relative to price inflation in  1973, as compared with econometric 
forecasts based on data for 1954-70? And to what extent has the price per- 
formance of 1973 permitted  profits to rebound along the predicted, normal, 
cyclical recovery path, in contrast with my earlier conclusion that Phases I 
and II, by depressing  prices, had held profits well below this path? Since the 
earlier  paper has evoked considerable controversy, I begin by reviewing the 
methodology of this genus of policy evaluation, and try to anticipate the 
likely direction of its inherent biases.3 
Methodological Preliminaries 
A primary purpose of time series econometric models is the application 
of historical hindsight. A model yields a set of dynamic multipliers for each 
exogenous policy variable-say,  government spending or the money supply 
-and  these allow the calculation of the magnitude of hypothetical policy 
actions that would have been necessary to avert a given historical episode 
of excess or insufficient demand. The simulated value of an endogenous 
variable (st) is a function of present and past actual values of exogenous 
variables (xt, x,-1) and past values of itself (s,-1): 
(1)  St =  f(xo,  Xt-1  St-1). 
An asterisk denotes the simulated values (s*) with an alternative hypothet- 
ical set of exogenous variables (x*, x* l): 
(2)  S*=  fG4t 4_,  stL). 
The set of dynamic multipliers describing the effect in period (t +  i) of a 
change in policy at time t is then 
(3)  mt.=  -St+  t 
-  Xt 
3. In addition to being attacked in the lead editorial of the  Wall Street Journal, 
December  5, 1972,  the main  conclusions  of the earlier  paper  differ  from  those reached  by 
several other authors, including Edgar L. Feige and Douglas K. Pearce, "The Wage- 
Price Control  Experiment-Did It Work?"  Challenge,  Vol. 16 (July/August 1973), and 
Timothy  McGuire,  "Controls  and Expectations"  (paper  presented  at the Rochester  Con- 
ference  on Wage-Price  Controls,  November  10, 1973; processed).  All of these alternative 
conclusions  are based on use of the consumer  price index, which has disadvantages  for 
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Unfortunately, the measurement of  the  effects of  wage-price control 
policies differs from that for monetary or fiscal policies for two basic rea- 
sons. First, parameters  that measure  the effect of money on spending can be 
estimated from historical periods during which the money supply varied, 
but parameters for the effect of controls on prices cannot be measured if 
controls were not  applied during the sample period of the econometric 
model. Second, and more important in principle, even if controls were ap- 
plied during the sample period-for  example, the Kennedy-Johnson guide- 
posts of 1962-66-there  is no quantitative measure of the "toughness" or 
pervasiveness of one control episode as compared to another, and thus no 
way to quantify the "policy input" in 1971-73 as compared with the earlier 
episode. 
For this reason econometric estimates of the effects of controls cannot be 
based on dynamic multipliers, but rather require a comparison of actual 
price or wage change (yt) with the hypothetical simulated values (st), based 
on actual values of exogenous variables. But this comparison introduces 
complications, because the actual outcome can differ from the simulated 
values for reasons other than the imposition of controls: 
(4)  Yt =  f(x,  xt-1, st-1) +  zt +  et +  ut, 
where the Zt are variables that were left out of the specified model either 
erroneously or unavoidably (that is,  zt did not  vary during the sample 
period); et is the error in measuring the actual y,;  and u, is  the random 
error term in the estimated econometric equation. 
The possible errors in evaluating the effect of controls can be classified 
with the aid of equation (4).4 
1. The model is erroneously specified and omits one or more variables 
(zt). For instance, my 1971 wage equation constrains the influence of past 
inflation to  operate with a fixed coefficient, whereas in  1972 I suggested 
several advantages of an otherwise identical equation in which the coeffi- 
cient on past price change is allowed to vary.5 A simulation of the alterna- 
4. I omit sheer  bad  luck from  this list of possible  errors.  Even if there  are no specifica- 
tion, estimation,  or measurement  problems  in the underlying  econometric  model, simula- 
tions could nevertheless  exaggerate  the effect  of controls  if the random  error  terms  in the 
original  equations  happen  to take on negative  values  in the control period.  While  one can 
always  argue  that price  increases  were  avoided  between  1971  and late 1972  not because  of 
controls  but because  sunspots  caused  entrepreneurs  to lose their  minds, I reject  this atti- 
tude as denying  the possibility  of any counterfactual  historical  investigation. 
5. The 1971 wage equation was originally  presented  in "Inflation  in Recession and 
Recovery,"  BPEA (1:1971), pp. 105-58. 768  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
tive variable-coefficient  equation indicated a greater  inflation in the absence 
of controls than did the fixed-coefficient  version. Those who disagree with 
the specification  of a given model can in general determine  whether  the pro- 
posed change increases or reduces the estimated effect of controls; in this 
particular  case the alternative  specification  indicates that the basic equation 
understates the effect. 
2.  Sometimes misspecification cannot be avoided if a variable that is 
assumed a priori to influence prices or wages exhibits little variance in the 
sample period, thus preventing the estimation of a statistically significant 
coefficient.  An example is the effect on nonfarm prices of changes in import 
prices, for which I  was unable to  obtain significant coefficients in  my 
original paper because divergences between the two were relatively minor 
before 1971.6 (As I argue below, prices in the other exogenous sector, agri- 
culture, would not be assumed a priori to influence nonfarm prices.) 
The importance of this omission is obvious in 1973, when import prices 
rose much faster than nonfarm prices. If the a priori coefficient on these 
prices is positive, then in the absence of controls nonfarm prices would have 
risen more rapidly than the simulated values (st), and the effect of the con- 
trols would be understated. This effect is mitigated to the extent that the 
spillover of demand from controlled goods caused  the import inflation, but 
I am convinced that the successive devaluations that were primarily re- 
sponsible would probably have come earlier without controls. 
3.  Econometric parameters are estimated with wide confidence inter- 
vals, so that simulations showing either large effects of controls or none at 
all can be calculated from alternative parameter estimates that cannot be 
statistically rejected. In my 1972 paper I illustrated alternative estimates of 
wage equations with the coefficient on past inflation constrained at alterna- 
tive values. The 5 percent confidence interval ranged from 0.4 to 1.1, and in 
principle the paper should have exhibited simulation results during the 
control period based on both extreme values. My conjecture is that this fac- 
tor again leads to an understatement of the effect of controls, since exten- 
sions  of  the sample period to  dates successively closer to  August  1971 
6. I have recently  replicated  these experiments,  which involve adding to the basic 
price  equation  a polynomial  distributed  lag on the quarterly  rate of change of the price 
deflator for imports in the national accounts. The results are as follows: (1) In the 
"basic"  sample  period  (1954:2-1970:4) the import  deflator  is insignificant,  with a t-value 
of 1.33 on the sum of the coefficients.  (2) When  the sample  period  is extended  to the last 
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yield successively higher point estimates of this coefficient; thus the true 
value of the coefficient after 1971 without controls was more likely to have 
been at the high than the low end of the sample period confidence interval.7 
4.  Variables taken as exogenous, the x, in equation (4) above, may in 
fact be influenced by controls. In my 1972 paper the effects of controls were 
estimated on the assumption that unemployment rates and the excess de- 
mand for commodities were unaffected by controls, involving the implicit 
assumption of "a monetary and fiscal policy sufficiently  accommodating to 
have allowed nominal gross national product to grow faster in the absence 
of controls by the estimated effect of the controls."8 Others may prefer to 
take monetary and fiscal policy and nominal income as exogenous,  and 
compute the simulations for the unemployment rates and excess demand 
for commodities that would have accompanied that fixed nominal income. 
One would have expected the second set of assumptions to have produced a 
lower hypothetical rate of  inflation,  since  the  alternative simulation is 
based on higher unemployment rates; but in fact the model generates a 
Phillips curve that is sufficiently horizontal in the very short run to yield 
identical inflation predictions for very different unemployment rates.9 In a 
longer simulation, for more than a single year, one would expect the alter- 
native exogeneity assumptions to produce results that diverge by a greater 
amount. 
5.  The measurement error (et) in equation (4) may be important if con- 
trols by themselves cause distortions in price measurement. To the extent 
that controls are binding and are accompanied by rationing, there is some 
vector of shadow prices (pt)  at which the rationed quantities would be the 
preferred, utility-maximizing amounts of  those  goods.10 In this welfare 
sense, the  "true" nonfarm price deflator that is relevant for individual 
utility functions is then a weighted average of actual prices for uncontrolled 
7. This same comment  applies to Oi's demonstration  that this coefficient  is very un- 
stable  and is much  higher  during  the subsample  period  1962-70  than during  1954-61.  See 
Walter  Y. Oi, "On Measuring  the Impact of Controls: A Critical  Appraisal"  (paper 
presented  to the Rochester Conference  on Wage-Price  Controls, November 9,  1973; 
processed). 
8. "Wage-Price  Controls,"  p. 412. 
9. The assumption  of exogenous  nominal  GNP growth  reduced  the estimated  effect  of 
controls on prices by only 0.06 percent per annum, as compared  with the simulation 
based on exogenous  unemployment.  See ibid. 
10. See James  Tobin and H. S. Houthakker,  "The Effects of Rationing on Demand 
Elasticities,"  Review  of Economic  Studies,  Vol. 18 (1950-51), pp. 140-53. I am indebted  to 
Walter  Oi for bringing  this point to my attention. "I  .t 
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goods  and  the shadow  prices  of controlled  goods;  such  a price  concept  rises 
during  a control  period  relative  to the actual  nonfarm  deflator.  Thus  to the 
extent  that  rationing  is important,  the use of the actual  deflator  overstates 
real income  in the welfare  sense and hence overstates  the "true"  rate of 
price  increase.  Since  reports  of shortages  and  rationing  were  rare  during  the 
1971-72  period  of concern  in my earlier  paper,  I doubt  that this problem 
has a significant  effect  on its results.  However,  it clearly  has become  more 
important  in recent  months. 
Another  variety  of measurement  problem  concerns  the differing  evalu- 
ations  of controls  implied  by the nonfarm  price  index  (used  in my study) 
and the consumer  price  index  (used  by the Wall  Street  Journal,  Feige and 
Pearce,  and McGuire).  Since  the latter  differs  mainly  in applying  positive 
rather  than zero weights  to farm  prices  and mortgage  interest  rates, one 
must  decide  whether  the behavior  of these  prices  was exogenous  or altered 
by the controls.  Since  I believe  in their exogeneity  during  this interval,  I 
feel that use of the CPI confuses  the effect  of controls  with  the exogenous 
disturbances  which by coincidence  happened  partially  or completely  to 
offset  the impact  of controls." 
Alternative  Counterfactual  Simulations  for 1971-73 
The  results  of the simulations  are  displayed  in Table  1. Actual  and  simu- 
lated values are compared  for the annual rate of change, during each 
quarter  between  1971:3  and 1973:3,  of the nonfarm  fixed-weight  wage  in- 
dex, the nonfarm  fixed-weight  deflator,  and  the ratio  of price  to unit labor 
cost. In the case of wages  the actual  values  are  displayed  in column  (1), the 
results  of a full  dynamic  simulation  of my "basic"  wage  and  price  equations 
in column  (2), and the difference  between  the two in column  (3).12  The 
same  information  for prices  is contained  in columns  (7), (8), and (9), and 
for the ratio  of price  to unit  labor  cost in columns  (13),  (14), and (15). 
11. To justify use of the CPI, one would have to argue that the successive  devalua- 
tions, the corn blight,  the Russian  wheat deal, and the Peruvian  anchovy  die-off, which 
contributed  to the farm  and import  price  inflation,  were  not exogenous  forces  but  instead 
were  caused directly  by the controls. 
12. The wage and price equations  are from my 1972 paper,  "Wage-Price  Controls," 
Table 3, pp. 398-99, column (6); and Table 4, p. 407, column (3). The simulation  pro- 
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Compared  with the "standard"  view that in 1973  wages  have been sur- 
prisingly  sluggish  while prices  have rebounded  enough  to cancel at least 
partially  the effects  of Phases  I and  II (which  covered  August  1971  through 
January  1973),  the results  of the simulations  contain  two basic surprises. 
Surprise  nwnber  one is that prices  have not yet made up for any of the 
effect  of the first  two phases,  and  in fact in 1973  have  continued  to fall be- 
hind  the  simulated  values  at an average  annual  rate  of 0.58  percent.  Whereas 
at the end of the sample  period  covered  in the earlier  paper  (1972:2) the 
actual  ratio  of price  to unit  labor  cost had  fallen  1.6  percent  below  its simu- 
lated value,  the shortfall  by 1973:3 was an even higher  2.5 percent.  The 
standard  view is correct  only in that the rate  at which  actual  price  change 
has fallen  short  of the simulated  change  has been much  less in 1973  than 
before. 
Surprise  number  two  is the behavior  of wages.  While  column  (3) super- 
ficially  appears  to indicate  a greater  residual  in 1973  than  in 1972,  this  is due 
entirely  to the indirect  effect  of prices  on wages.  A separate  simulation  (B) 
calculates  the wage  change  that would  have occurred  if price  expectations 
had been  based  on actual  rather  than  hypothetical  price  performance.  The 
difference  between  actual  wage change  and simulation  (B) is reported  in 
column  (4), with  a very  small  negative  residual  in the first  two phases  but a 
positive  residual  in 1973. Given the actual price performance,  therefore, 
wages  have  increased  slightlyfaster  in 1973  than  the econometric  equation 
predicts.  Simulation  (B')  in column  (10) shows  in parallel  fashion  the infla- 
tion that would  have occurred  with  actual  wage  change  exogenous. 
The econometric  simulations  can be decomposed  to reveal  the contribu- 
tion of each independent  variable  to the full dynamic  predictions  in col- 
umns  (2) and (8). Wage and price  change  would have been considerably 
more  rapid  during  1973  than  1972  even  with  no allowance  for  the  relaxation 
of controls  in Phase III or for the explosion  of farm  and import  prices. 
About  half  of the simulated  increase  in wages  between  early  1972  and 1973 
can be accounted  for by the tightening  of labor  markets  (0.68  percent  at an 
annual  rate),  and almost  all of the remainder  by the very  large  increase  in 
the effective  social  security  tax rate  in 1973:1  .13 The lags in the formation 
of expectations  in the wage  equation  are  sufficiently  long to have  prevented 
an appreciable  price-wage  feedback  as of 1973:3. In the price equation 
13. In percentage  terms the social security  tax increase  in 1973:1 was the largest  in 
postwar  history,  exceeding  the previous  champion  (1966:  1). Robert J. Gordon  773 
most of the acceleration  has been due to excess  commodity  demand;  the 
increase  in the ratio of unfilled  orders  to capacity  between  early  1972  and 
mid-1973  accounted  for an annual  rate of price increase  of 0.6 percent. 
Another  0.4 percent  was accounted  for by the slowdown  of productivity 
growth  from the very  rapid  rates of mid-1972.  Wage  change  had not yet 
begun  appreciably  to affect  price  change  as of 1973:3. 
Table 1 also illustrates  the results  of two additional  alternative  sets of 
simulations.  Columns  (5) and (11) illustrate  simulation  (C) in which the 
path of nominal  income is kept exogenous,  as compared  with the basic 
simulation  (A) in which  unemployment  and  real  output  are  exogenous.  As 
expected,  an exogenous  nominal  income  path results  in higher  unemploy- 
ment,  lower simulated  wage  change,  and a lower estimated  effect  of con- 
trols  than  in the basic  simulation.  The  difference  grows  steadily  throughout 
1972 and into 1973 as the higher  unemployment  rates along path C are 
gradually  converted  into lower simulated  inflation  rates.  This simulation 
does  not overturn  the  basic  conclusion  that  Phases  I and  II had  a significant 
effect,  although  it indicates  that  actual  prices  have  kept  even  with  the simu- 
lated values  in 1973.  By mid-1973  the difference  between  the two simula- 
tions had begun  to decline,  as the lower  inflation  along path C began  to 
reduce  the unemployment  rate  toward  its level  along  path  A. 
The final  simulation,  (D), is based  on the variable-coefficient  version  of 
the wage equation  (in which  the coefficient  on past inflation  is a variable 
function  of the rate of inflation,  with a maximum  value  of unity).14  With 
this alternative  version of the wage-price  model, prices and wages are 
simulated  to have advanced  faster  than  in the basic  simulation;  in this al- 
ternative,  a high  coefficient  on past  inflation  in the wage  equation  prevents 
unemployment  from  holding  down  wages  as  much  as  in the  basic  simulation. 
Untangling  the Effects  of Import  Prices 
All of the simulations  displayed  in Table 1 implicitly  assume  that  in the 
absence  of controls  nonfarm  prices  would  not have  responded  to farm  and 
import  prices  in 1973,  because  these  prices  are  excluded  from  the  basic  price 
equation  for  the  nonfarm  sector.  To the extent  that  a priori  one would  have 
14. A discussion  of the variable-coefficient  version and the estimated  coefficients  is 
presented  in "Wage-Price  Controls,"  pp. 404-06. 774  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
expected  some effect, an extrapolation  of equations  fitted  to the sample 
period  may  be misleading  for 1973.  If the "true"  coefficients  on either  farm 
or import  prices  in the nonfarm  price  equation  are  positive,  then  all of the 
results  in Table  1 understate  the simulated  values  and hence  understate  the 
impact  of controls,  given  the crucial  assumption  that  the behavior  of farm 
and  import  prices  can be treated  as exogenous  and unaffected  by controls. 
A priori  it might  appear  that the true coefficients  on farm  and import 
prices  in the nonfarm  price equation  should  be positive.  But by its very 
method  of construction  the nonfarm  private  deflator  excludes  any direct 
influence  of external  prices.  For example,  suppose  the weight  of the farm 
sector  in total private  output  is 3 percent.  If the price of farm  products 
doubles,  and the average  price  of all private  goods  increases  by 3 percent, 
then the nonfarm  price  index is constant  by construction.'5  Farm prices 
would raise nonfarm  prices  only if capital  and labor income  per unit of 
output  were  increased  as a result  of an increase  in farm  prices.  On the con- 
trary,  wholesale  and retail  food margins  appear  to have been compressed 
during  the 1973  upsurge  in farm  prices.'6 
The direct  influence  of import  prices  is also excluded  from  the nonfarm 
deflator  by construction.  But an acceleration  of import  price  inflation  may 
have  an important  positive  indirect  effect  on the  prices  of import-competing 
goods  in the nonfarm  sector.  For instance,  the prices  of small  domestically 
produced  automobiles  that compete  with  imports  increased  at a much  fas- 
ter  rate  than  those  of large  cars  after  the  import  "price  umbrella"  was lifted 
in the 1972-73  period.  No precise  a priori  estimate  of this  effect  is possible, 
because  in the spectrum  of substitution  between  foreign  and  domestic  goods 
there  is no unique  cut-off  point between  goods that are perfect  substitutes 
at one extreme  and those with zero substitutability  at the other.  In addi- 
tion, the indirect  effect  of higher  import  prices  following  a devaluation  is 
not instantaneous  but operates  with a distributed  lag. 
15. This method  is called "double  deflation."  The rate of change  in the nonfarm  pri- 
vate  deflator  is equal  to the rate of change  in the deflator  for all private  domestic  produc- 
tion (including  exports),  minus the rates of change of farm  and import prices,  weighted 
by the respective  current-dollar  values of farm output and imports as a percentage  of 
current-dollar  private  output. 
16. William  D. Nordhaus  has performed  some unpublished  calculations,  based on a 
fifty-eight-sector  input-output  table, which indicate  that the inflation  in wholesale  food 
prices  can be accounted  for entirely  by the direct effect of higher  farm prices,  with no 
additional  impetus  from higher  profits  or wages.  On top of this, retail-wholesale  margins 
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Table  2. Effects  of Inflation  of Import  Prices  on the Nonfarm  Price 
Deflator,  1971:3-1975:4 
Quarterly  percentage  rates of change at annual  rates 
Year and 
quarter  Effect 
1971:3  0.76 
4  0.76 
1972:1  0.72 
2  0.72 
3  0.76 
4  0.80 
1973:1  0.84 
2  1.00 
3  1.28 
4  1.52a 
1974:1  1.64a 
2  1.64a 
3  1.56k 
4  1.360 
1975:1  1.12a 
2  0.84a 
3  0.56% 
4  0.32a 
Sources: Estimated  from basic price equation used in Table 1, refitted  to permit  import prices to influence 
nonfarm prices with a distributed  lag. 
a.  Estimated on the assumption of zero change for import prices after 1973:3. 
Thus  both the size of the ultimate  effect  and the lag pattern  must  be de- 
termined  on empirical  rather  than theoretical  grounds.  My basic price 
equation  has been refitted  to allow import prices  to influence  nonfarm 
prices  with a distributed  lag, just as labor  costs operate  with a lag in the 
original  basic equation.17  Table  2 illustrates  the effects  of the inflation  of 
import  prices  on nonfarm  prices  in the first  three quarters  of 1973, and 
shows  an average  effect  only slightly  higher  than in mid-1971.  This raises 
the basic  estimate  of the 1973  price  shortfall  by about  0.3 percent. 
The most important  implication  of Table  2, however,  is for the future. 
17. The auxiliary  equation  was estimated  for the same  period  as the original  equation, 
1954:2 through  1970:4.  The extra  variable  is a polynomial  distributed  lag of past  changes 
in the quarterly  change in the national  accounts  import deflator,  with a twelve-quarter 
lag distribution  constrained  as in the basic equation.  The estimated  sum of the coeffi- 
cients is 0.133, the t-ratio  on the sum of the coefficients  is 1.33, and the mean lag is 5.1 
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Even on the unrealistic  assumption  of zero change  in import  prices  after 
1973:3,  the lagged  effects  of the import  inflation  that has already  occurred 
imply  an average  of 0.8 percent  extra inflation  during  the next four quar- 
ters,  as compared  with the outcome  had import  prices  not accelerated  in 
1973. 
The results  of Table  2 should  be regarded  as suggestive  rather  than  con- 
clusive.  The  sum  of the coefficients  on import  prices  in the underlying  price 
equation  is quite  unstable  when  the sample  period  is varied  even  by only a 
few quarters,  although  the shape  of the lag distribution  is quite  stable.  An 
alternative  is available  from Magee's  calculations  of import  competitive- 
ness  at the four-digit  industry  level  in manufacturing.18  According  to these 
estimates,  the sum  of the coefficients  of the import  effect  should  be reduced 
from  0.13 to 0.052, and each  figure  in Table  2 consequently  should  be re- 
duced  by about  60 percent  of its stated  value.  Furthermore,  to the extent 
that the inflation  in farm  prices  has temporarily  reduced  margins  in the 
nonfarm  sector,  the "true"  impact  of higher  prices  of inputs  to the nonfarm 
sector  in 1973  may have  been zero or slightly  negative.19 
Conclusions 
The standard  view of inflation  in 1973  appears  to require  reconsidera- 
tion, according  to the major  conclusions  of this paper: 
1. In comparison  with  the "basic"  simulation  of an econometric  model 
fitted  to the precontrol  period,  nonfarm  prices  rose at an annual  rate  that 
was about 2.3 percent  slower  than the simulated  values  during  Phases  I 
and  II.20  None  of this  shortfall  has  been  made  up during  Phases  III and  IV; 
on the contrary,  nonfarm  prices  have fallen another  0.6 percent  behind 
their  simulated  values. 
18. See Stephen P. Magee, "The Welfare Effects of Restrictions  on U.S. Trade," 
BPEA  (3:1972), Table 3, p. 663, line 12. 
19. The original price equation was also reestimated  with a distributed  lag on past 
changes  in wholesale  farm  prices  entered  separately,  in addition  to the distributed  lag on 
past  changes  in import  prices.  The coefficients  are highly  unstable  when the ending  date 
of the sample  period  is shifted  from 1970:4 to 1971:3, and the sum of the coefficients  is 
insignificantly  different  from zero. 
20. This conclusion  is supported  by similar  simulations  of the price equation  in the 
Federal  Reserve-MIT-Penn  econometric  model. These  yield an estimate  of a 2.1 percent 
effect  of price  controls  during  Phases  I and II, according  to an unpublished  memorandum 
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2. While  wages  have risen  less rapidly  than in the no-controls  simula- 
tion-at  a rate  of about  0.6 percent  during  Phases  I and  II and of about  1.1 
percent  in 1973-this has been due entirely  to the indirect  impact  of slow 
price growth  on wage behavior.  Controls  have had no direct effect on 
wages,  given  the actual  behavior  of prices. 
3. Econometric  estimates  of the effects  of controls  are  subject  to a num- 
ber of possible  biases  due to errors  of specification,  estimation,  and mea- 
surement.  One of these  biases  appears  to point  to an underestimate  of the 
effect  of controls  reported  in this  paper:  an alternative  version  of the wage 
equation  with variable  coefficients  on past inflation  yields  a considerably 
larger  estimated  impact  of the controls. 
4. The simulations  assume  that real output  and unemployment  would 
have  been  the  same  with  or  without  the  controls.  To the  extent  that  nominal 
income  is exogenous,  unemployment  would  have been higher  without  the 
controls,  and inflation  would have been lower in the basic simulation. 
However,  an alternative  simulation,  treating  nominal  income  as exogenous, 
indicates  that  this source  of bias  is not potent  enough  to reverse  the major 
conclusions  of the paper. 
5. In a controlled  economy "true"  prices-those that would be ap- 
propriate  to measure  real  income  in an economic  welfare  sense-are under- 
stated  when  controls  are  accompanied  by rationing.  In this  sense,  the simu- 
lations  overstate  the benefits  of lower  prices  associated  with  controls  to an 
unknown  degree  for  the 1973  period,  during  which  shortages  of goods  have 
been  widely  reported. 
6. The evidence  that the effects  of import  price  inflation  operate  with a 
distributed  lag indicates  that  at the end of 1973  there  was  a modest  amount 
of extra  inflation  in the pipeline  which  will tend  to cause  prices  to increase 
faster  during  1974  than they would  have otherwise. 
7. Most important,  the data  that suggest  that  price  controls  checked  in- 
flation  in the 1971-73  period  are  not clear  evidence  that  the controls  "suc- 
ceeded."  Controls  worked  not by moderating  the behavior  of wages  rela- 
tive to prices,  but rather  by squeezing  profit  margins  sufficiently  to hold 
prices  below their free market  levels. This is not a situation  that can be 
expected  to last indefinitely,  and  hence  the very  fact of short-run  "success" 
for the control program  guarantees  its long-run  failure.  Only if factors 
other  than  the control  program  kept profit  margins  from exhibiting  their 
usual  cyclical  rebound  during  1971-72  can  one  expect  that  the  profit  squeeze 
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margins  eventually  return  to their  no-controls  level,  there  will  be a catch-up 
period  after  the controls  are  lifted  during  which  the rate  of inflation  will  be 
substantially  faster  than  it would  have  been had the controls  not been  im- 
posed. On the assumption  that profit  margins  will eventually  be reestab- 
lished,  one can cite at least four reasons  for concluding  that the controls 
were  a failure: 
1. Controls  will have  had no long-run  effect  on inflation. 
2. The removal  of controls  will cause  an extra,  "catch-up,"  inflation  at 
some point; the timing  of this catch-up  may be awkward,  if, for example, 
nonfarm prices are simultaneously  escalating because of  the energy 
shortage. 
3. Controls  have caused shortages  and misallocations  of resources  in 
several  sectors. 
4. The administration  of controls  has consumed  real  resources. 
Discussion 
JOEL  POPKIN  OFFERED several  comments  on price behavior  related to 
Gordon's  paper.  He noted  that it is often  difficult  to analyze  the effective- 
ness of price  controls  in a macroeconomic  context,  and found  it helpful  to 
study  the price  data  on a sectoral  basis  or by stage  of distribution.  In such 
an analysis,  two recent  tendencies  are outstanding.  First  is a turnabout  in 
the inflationary  tendencies  of services  relative  to commodities.  Over the 
past  ten or fifteen  years,  prices  for  services  have  risen  about  1 to 2 percent  a 
year  faster  than  prices  for commodities;  but, in late 1972  and in 1973,  the 
two groups  have  risen  at roughly  comparable  rates.  Second,  nonfood  com- 
modities  in the consumer  price  index lately have risen  much less rapidly 
than  their  counterparts  in the wholesale  price  index,  indicating  a compres- 
sion of distribution  margins.  While  these  two developments  have  occurred 
during  the period  of controls,  Popkin regarded  as open the question  of 
whether  controls  caused  them. 
William  Nordhaus  expressed  his  doubts  about  attributing  a narrowing  of 
profit  margins  to controls,  since  a squeeze  on profits  had been under  way 
for several  years  before  controls  were  imposed.  Nordhaus  also cited some Robert J. Gordon  779 
research  that  he and  John  Shoven  had  done  on recent  price  behavior.  They 
found that, if prices  of raw and basic commodities  were taken as given, 
other  prices  were  readily  predicted,  suggesting  that  there  were  no mysteries 
in the margins  of manufacturers  or distributors.  Finally,  Nordhaus  sus- 
pected  that Gordon's  lags on import  prices  in Table  2 were  too long, re- 
marking  that the British  experience  with the devaluation  of the pound 
suggested  that increases  in import  prices  are passed through  rapidly  to 
other  prices;  food prices  had responded  fully within  two months  and all 
other  prices  within  six months.  William  Branson  offered  the opinion  that 
the  appropriate  weight  for  import  prices  in Gordon's  overall  price  equation 
might  be close  to the weight  of tradeable  goods  in total output,  or roughly 
one-third,  rather  than the 13 percent  used  by Gordon. 
Michael  Wachter  took issue  with Gordon's  standard  for evaluating  the 
effects  of wage-price  controls.  Gordon  had focused  on the rate  of increase 
of prices  during  recent  quarters,  whereas  Wachter  felt that  the crucial  con- 
sideration  was the potential  for future  inflation.  He remarked  that  govern- 
ment  control  policies  should  be  judged  successful  only  if they  alleviated  in- 
flationary  pressures  in ways that would affect  prices  favorably  even after 
controls  were  lifted.  Gordon  added  his agreement  and pointed  to his con- 
cluding  paragraphs,  which  emphasize  the potential  for future  inflation  in 
the recent  suppression  of profit  margins. 
Gardner  Ackley inquired  about the history of the equations  used in 
Gordon's  simulations.  He wondered  whether  Gordon's  equations  might 
have  an upward  bias on prices  insofar  as they  had been  revamped  to track 
the 1969-71  period.  Price  equations  that explained  the unique  1969-71  ex- 
perience  might  overpredict  the expected  rate  of price  increase.  Gordon  felt 
that no important  bias of that type was present  since his sample  period 
ended  in 1970  and  the price  equation  had  displayed  no instability  in 1969- 
70. The  instabilities  of that  period  emerged  in the behavior  of wages. 
George  Perry  suggested  that a simple  validation  of Gordon's  general  re- 
sults  could  be obtained  by examining  the difference  between  recent  rates  of 
increase  in nonfarm  prices  and wages.  He noted that nonfarm  prices  had 
risen  at a rate  of about  3 percent  during  the period  of controls,  while  aver- 
age hourly  compensation  had risen  at 7 percent,  a difference  of roughly 
4 percent,  far greater  than the long-run  average  difference  of less than 3 
percent. 